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I. Introduction 
The attack methods from which a terrorist chooses are prospects, the most immediate outcomes of which 
are the fatalities that are inflicted. Hence, in this paper, a prospect is an attack method that is expected to 
inflict fatalities 𝑥𝑖  with probability 𝑝𝑖 , where (𝑝1 + 𝑝2 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑛 = 1). There are at least several ways to 
predict which prospect a terrorist will choose when confronted with a pair of risky prospects. Cumulative 
prospect theory (CPT) is one approach. Others include expected value, expected utility and stochastic 
dominance. Each method has strengths and weaknesses. Each requires different information about the 
decision-maker and the prospects under consideration. Stochastic dominance has found widespread 
application in economics because of its generality (Hadar and Russell 1969; Hanoch and Levy 1969; 
Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970 & 1971; Meyer 1977a & 1977b; Levy 1992). CPT is consistent with stochastic 
dominance (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Levy and Wiener 2013). Our analysis draws on both of these 
approaches and the common ground between them.  
 
A law enforcement problem lies at the heart of the analysis and provides the motivation for it: When will a 
terrorist choose a higher risk, higher expected impact attack method? Or, more succinctly, where are the 
‘trigger points’ at which the terrorist who initially selects the less risky attack method switches to the more 
risky alternative? We reduce this complex problem to some basic components and examine the terrorist’s 
choice between a pair of attack methods where one attack method is more risky than the other1. Because 
there is a generally positive relationship between the average number of fatalities inflicted by terrorist 
attacks and the variability or risk of those outcomes, it is important to study the circumstances under which 
terrorists may choose the more risky of two alternatives. Two aspects of the decision-making process are 
singled out: (1) reference points; and (2) cumulative distribution intersection points. Both of these aspects 
of the decision-making process are fundamental to answering the questions posed above.  
 
We start by analysing different pairs of attack methods by first-order (FSD) and second-order (SSD) 
stochastic dominance. We also apply CPT to each pair of attack methods. For each approach, basic orderings 
of the attack methods within each pair are determined. We draw on recent advances in the economic theory 
of risk-taking and incentives to explain why a reordering of the FSD-SSD rankings of prospects may be 
observed when certain (convex) incentive structures apply to terrorist actions. In particular, we identify 
the outcomes, 𝑥𝑖 , to which these incentives must apply in order to compel a terrorist—the terrorist group 
member or members—to choose the potentially more (or less) damaging attack method. We note that in 
most cases where a trigger point exists, even a terrorist with a relatively low reference point will already 
have accorded a higher prospect value to the higher risk attack method. The terrorist will prefer it in the 
absence of any additional incentives.  
 
                                                          
1 When is something more risky than before? And when is something more risky than something else? There is not a 
straightforward answer to these questions and, unfortunately, no definitive ‘proof’ that one definition of ‘riskier’ is better 
than another definition (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970, p.226-227). According to Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), possible 
answers to the question include (1) Y is riskier than X when Y is equal to X plus some noise; (2) Y is riskier than X if every 
person who is risk averse prefers X to Y; (3) Y is riskier than X if Y has more weight in the tails of its probability distribution; 
(4) Y is riskier than X if Y has a greater variance or standard deviation than X. 
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Built on the foundation provided by Becker (1968), Ehrlich (1973), Landes (1978) and Sandler et al. (1983), 
the accumulated results from the application of economic theory to the study of terrorist choice now 
encompass such important topics as: (1) the strategic behaviour of terrorists (Sandler et al. 1983; Atkinson 
et al. 1987; Lapan and Sandler 1988; Sandler and Scott 1987; Rosendorff and Sandler 2004; Siqueira and 
Sandler 2006); (2) explanations for the stylised facts characterising the time series of terrorist actions 
(Enders and Sandler 2002; Enders and Sandler 2005); (3) terrorist choice of attack targets and attack 
methods (Barros et al. 2007; Brandt and Sandler 2010; Santifort et al. 2013; Phillips 2009; 2011) and; (4) 
the implications of particular aspects of choice, especially substitution and deterrence (Frey and 
Luechinger 2003; Phillips 2013). Reviews are contained in Sandler and Enders (2004), Intriligator (2010) 
and Schneider et al. (2014). A sketch of the ‘new frontiers’ for terrorism research is contained in Sandler 
(2011). A summary of the application of ‘rational choice’ models to the analysis of terrorism is contained 
in Anderton and Carter (2005). Behavioural models, especially Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) CPT, have 
recently been applied in ways that complement the existing orthodox approaches (Butler 2007; Phillips 
and Pohl 2014). This paper uses both orthodox and behavioural approaches to contribute to the ongoing 
research program.  
 
Our contribution is organised as follows. Section II presents the theory that underlies the analysis. This 
includes CPT and the stochastic dominance criteria. Section III presents an analysis of the RAND-MIPT and 
Global Terrorist Database (GTD) attack methods. Instances of FSD and SSD are identified. Section IV 
presents an analysis of the ‘trigger points’ or those outcomes that are associated with a higher likelihood 
that the decision-maker will select the more risky alternative from a given pair. These are identified from 
both the CPT and stochastic dominance perspectives. Section V concludes the paper.  
 
II. Theory 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) developed prospect theory (PT) and later revised it (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992). The revised version is called cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to highlight its use of the 
‘cumulative functional’ which transforms cumulative probabilities rather than individual probabilities 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1992, p.298). The theory is based on behaviour observed in economics 
experiments where individuals are asked to choose between different risky prospects. Several violations 
of orthodox expected utility theory were observed in experiments. These violations are called biases. The 
main types of behavioural bias encompassed by prospect theory are:  
 
(1) Decision-makers assess risky prospects relative to a reference point rather than in absolute terms. The 
decision is reference dependent.  
(2) Decision-makers are risk-averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. They 
prefer to take risk to avoid a certain loss but will tend to avoid risk if a gain has been secured. 
(3) Losses loom larger than gains. A loss of some magnitude will weigh more heavily on the decision-maker 
than a gain of the same magnitude. The decision-maker is loss averse.  
(4) Outcomes that are a long way from the reference point have less impact on the assessment of a 
prospect’s value. This is called diminishing sensitivity.  
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Formally, the theory depicts the decision-maker as assigning a prospect value, V, to each risky prospect by 
the application of the value function, 
 𝑉 = ∑𝑣(∆𝑥𝑖) 𝜋(𝑝𝑖)         (1) 
Values, 𝑣, are assigned to outcomes 𝑥𝑖  by a decision-maker who assesses the outcomes relative to a 
reference point and whose behaviour exhibits risk seeking or risk aversion depending on whether an 
outcome is above or below the reference point,  
 𝑣(∆𝑥) = {
𝑣(∆𝑥)𝛼 ∆𝑥 ≥ 0
−𝜆(−∆𝑥)𝛽 ∆𝑥 < 0
}        (2) 
Unlike expected utility theory, values are not directly weighted by their probability of occurrence. Rather, 
the cumulative probabilities themselves are weighted by 𝜋 before being applied. The probability weighting 
functions are the most complex component of prospect theory, 
 𝜋𝑖 = {
𝜋𝑖
− = 𝑤−(𝑝1 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑖) − 𝑤
−(𝑝1 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑖−1) ∆𝑥 < 0
𝜋𝑖
+ = 𝑤+(𝑝𝑖 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑁) − 𝑤
+(𝑝𝑖+1 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑁) ∆𝑥 ≥ 0
}    (3) 
 
  =
{
 
 
 
 𝑤
+(𝑝) ≔
(𝑝)𝛾
(𝑝𝛾+(1−𝑝)𝛾)1/𝛾
∆𝑥 ≥ 0
𝑤−(𝑝) ≔
(𝑝)𝛿
(𝑝𝛿+(1−𝑝)𝛿)
1/𝛿 ∆𝑥 < 0
}
 
 
 
 
      (4) 
Prospect theory yields the S-shaped utility function depicted in Figure 1. It shows a utility function that 
inflects at the reference point such that a concave or risk-averse segment traverses the domain of gains and 
a convex or risk seeking segment traverses the domain of losses.  
 
Figure 1 
The S-Shaped Utility Function of Prospect Theory 
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The precise shape of the utility function depends on the values of the parameters in equations (2) and (4). 
Estimates of the parameter values differ. Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p.311) report a set of estimates. 
These are the values that we use in our analysis. Other estimates have been contributed by Camerer and 
Ho (1994), Tversky and Fox (1995), Wu and Gonzalez (1996), Gonzalez and Wu (1999) and Bleichrodt and 
Pinto (2000). That the values for the parameters must be determined experimentally or inferred from 
empirical data is perceived to be a weakness of the theory. Another is that the reference point is not 
observable (Pesendorfer 2006, p.713-714). However, it is possible that reference points may emerge in 
different contexts that can at least provide some basis for an operationalisation of the theory. For example, 
Phillips and Pohl (2014) explore the choices of lone wolf terrorists who might reference their actions on 
the outcomes of terrorist attacks carried out by predecessors. That is, the outcomes of previous attacks 
provide a plausible set of reference points.  
 
The original version of prospect theory permitted violations of stochastic dominance. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) had assumed that decision-makers would rule out clearly dominated prospects during the 
‘editing phase’. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) developed CPT to remedy this shortcoming. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1992, p.299) note, with apparent dissatisfaction, that the assumption of stochastic dominance 
is one that theorists are ‘reluctant to give up’. But this is not surprising given the widespread application of 
stochastic dominance in economics (see Levy 1992; Bawa 1982). According to Hart (2011, p.617), 
“Stochastic dominance is a partial order on risky assets (gambles) that is based on the uniform 
preference—of all decision-makers in an appropriate class—for one gamble over another.” We state Levy’s 
(1992, p.555) theorem as a formal expression of stochastic dominance: Let F and G be the cumulative 
distributions of two distinct uncertain options (prospects or gambles), X and Y. F dominates G by FSD, SSD, and 
TSD if and only if: 
 𝐹(𝑋) ≤ 𝐺(𝑋) for all X (FSD),        (5) 
 ∫ [𝐺(𝑡) − 𝐹(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡 ≥ 0
𝑥
−∞
 for all X (SSD),       (6) 
 ∫ ∫ [𝐺(𝑡) − 𝐹(𝑡)]𝑑𝑡𝑑𝑣 ≥ 0
𝑣
−∞
𝑥
−∞
 for all X, and  
   𝐸𝐹(𝑋) ≥ 𝐸𝐺(𝑋) (TSD)       (7) 
One of the desirable properties of the stochastic dominance criteria is that it can be visualised by plotting 
the cumulative distributions for the prospects under consideration. Tversky and Kahneman (1986, p.253) 
explain, “…for unidimensional risky prospects, A is preferred to B if the cumulative distribution of A is to 
the right of the cumulative distribution of B.” For example, consider two risky prospects A and B, each with 
a cumulative distribution function F and G respectively. The two cumulative distributions are drawn in 
Figure 2. In this example, prospect A dominates prospect B by FSD and inequality (5) (above) is satisfied. 
The cumulative distribution for prospect A is located to the right of the cumulative distribution for prospect 
B. Second-order dominance is also reflected in the relative positions of the cumulative distributions for two 
prospects. In Figure 3 the cumulative distributions have been drawn such that they intersect each other. 
FSD does not apply because inequality (5) is violated. However, SSD may still apply. Since SSD may not be 
6 
 
obvious from a visual inspection of the cumulative distributions alone, it can be useful to plot the constraint 
integral (6) as well. In Figure 3 we depict the constraint integral (6) as being always positive (as required 
for SSD). In this case, F dominates G by SSD.  
 
Figure 2 
Cumulative Distributions F and G for Prospects A and B 
 
 
Figure 3 
Cumulative Distributions F and G and the Constraint Integral (6) 
 
The analysis presented in this paper concentrates on those points at which a terrorist’s selection of the 
more risky and more potentially damaging attack method from a given pair is triggered. If the terrorist 
originally chooses the less risky alternative but switches to the more risky alternative at some point, this 
change cannot violate or be inconsistent with FSD. It will be recalled that CPT is consistent with stochastic 
dominance and no ordering of prospects by prospect value should violate FSD. It is necessary to show how 
trigger points may emerge within the decision-making frameworks that have been introduced in this 
section without violating any of their fundamental tenets. Trigger points can emerge within CPT in 
situations where the statistical properties of the attack methods are such that they do not permit a clear 
stochastic dominance ordering. That is, where there is no clear stochastic dominance to violate. We return 
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to this later. Importantly, trigger points can emerge within the stochastic dominance framework even when 
one prospect clearly dominates another by SSD.  
 
Consider once more the two prospects A and B with respective cumulative distributions F and G depicted 
in figure 3 and assume that F dominates G by SSD. In this case, G is more risky than F. However, it is easy to 
see that at points to the right of the intersection of the two cumulative distributions G dominates F by FSD. 
Past the intersection of the two distributions the cumulative distribution for G is located to the right of the 
cumulative distribution for F. An incentive structure that censures the two probability distributions such 
that positive payoffs are received only at or beyond the level of outcome associated with the intersection 
of the two cumulative probability distributions will ensure that the more risky of the two alternatives is 
always chosen, regardless of the preferences of the decision-maker. Braido and Ferreira (2006) provide a 
proof of this in their analysis of risk-taking behaviour and options-based compensation schedules, where 
those compensation schedules are defined by a particular ‘strike price’ at which payoffs become positive.  
 
Braido and Ferreira (2006) show that there is a ‘strike price’ (trigger point) that will always entice the 
decision-maker who has been granted an option to choose the more risky of two alternatives. Braido and 
Ferreira (2006, p.516) state the familiar stochastic dominance criteria (above). For the case of two risky 
prospects with cumulative distributions F and G such that 𝐹 ≠ 𝐺 and F dominates G by SSD, 𝐹 ≿𝑠 𝐺, the 
authors state a weak technical assumption to rule out distribution functions that display ‘pathological 
behaviours’ in the neighbourhood of the upper-bound (T) of payoffs: Defining 𝑇𝐹𝐺  as the limit point at which 
the two distributions differ from each other:  
 𝑇𝐹𝐺 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝜃 ∈ [0, 𝑇]: 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝐺(𝑡)} for all 𝑡 ∈ [𝜃, 𝑇]     (8) 
Now, there is a neighbourhood of 𝑇𝐹𝐺  in which the number of times 𝐹(𝑡) − 𝐺(𝑡) changes sign is finite. 
Braido and Ferreira (2006, p.516) note that this assumption applies to all standard distributions. They 
follow with their main proposition, the proof of which is their main result. Their proposition is that under 
the technical assumption just delineated: there exists a strike price ?̂? ∈ (0, 𝑇) such that: 
 ∫ 𝑢(max(𝑡 − ?̂?, 0))𝑑𝐺(𝑡) > ∫ 𝑢(max(𝑡 − ?̂?, 0))𝑑𝐹(𝑡)
𝑇
𝑢
𝑇
0
      (9) 
Braido and Ferreira’s (2006, p.516-517) formal argument is illustrated by pointing out that the two 
cumulative distributions for F and G intersect and that F dominates G by SSD which implies 𝐺(𝑡) < 𝐹(𝑡) for 
all 𝑡 ∈ (?̂?, 𝑇𝐹𝐺). They point out that… “G always yields higher payoffs than F when the domain is restricted 
to values higher than ?̂?.” That is, for pairs of risky prospects characterised by cumulative distributions F 
and G where F dominates G by SSD there is a point beyond which G dominates F by FSD.  
 
We are interested in the circumstances under which a terrorist will choose the more risky and potentially 
more damaging attack method. Prospect theory provides one such clue about where to look for these 
‘trigger points’. Reference points provide a natural starting point. Because a higher reference point extends 
the loss domain and, by assumption the risk-seeking domain, more risky choices may be observed more 
often when decision-makers have relatively high reference points. Another clue is provided by stochastic 
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dominance. Braido and Ferreira (2006) have pointed out the relevance of the intersection points of the two 
cumulative probability distributions that describe alternative prospects. Intuitively one might think that 
the trigger points would be the same in both theoretical-statistical frameworks. That is, one might suspect 
that the reference point beyond which more risky prospects might be accorded higher prospect values than 
their less risky alternatives would align with the point at which the two cumulative distributions for the 
two prospects intersect. In the analysis that follows we show that this is not the case. Trigger points within 
prospect theory, when they exist, occur sooner.  
 
III. Attack Methods 
The analysis draws on two different databases: annual RAND-MIPT data for the period 1968 to 2007 and 
monthly Global Terrorism Database (GTD) data for the period 2000 to 2008. The RAND database 
concentrates on the outcomes of transnational terrorist attacks. For example, a bombing in one country 
carried out by a terrorist group based in another country or an attack by a domestic group on an 
international target within the group’s home country2. The GTD lists all attacks, including those with both 
domestic origins and targets. Each database covers a number of attack methods and each lists the outcomes 
for each attack: the fatalities and injuries that were inflicted. As explained above, the analysis treats an 
attack method as a risky prospect that is expected to inflict fatalities 𝑥𝑖  with probability 𝑝𝑖 , where 
(𝑝1 + 𝑝2 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑛 = 1). Fatalities per attack (per year) are assumed to be log-normally distributed3. Using 
the log-normal hypothesis avoids truncating the distribution at 0 to allow for the fact that expected 
fatalities cannot be negative. Like other distributions that might be assumed for either of the established 
terrorism databases, the assumption of a log-normal distribution cannot on its own incorporate the weight 
that terrorists may apply in their decision-making to the possibility that the planned attack may be pre-
empted and the plot foiled before any terrorist operation can be carried out. Collecting these cases and 
incorporating them into the analysis may be a task for future research4. For most attack methods, the log-
normality hypothesis cannot be rejected when computed over the outcomes of successful attacks (attacks 
that inflicted at least one fatality). The analysis presented here holds for all standard distribution functions 
(see Braido and Ferreira 2006, p.516). Descriptive statistics for each of the two datasets are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2, including the Shapiro-Wilkes test-statistics (W) for log-normality. A Shapiro-Wilkes statistic 
𝑊 < 0.05 rejects the null hypothesis that the data are log-normally distributed.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 An example is an attack on an embassy.  
3 Assassination is an exception. However, the outcomes (fatalities) per ‘assassination’ attack are normally distributed. That 
is, the normality assumption cannot be rejected for ‘assassination’. The Shapiro-Wilkes statistic is 0.245.  
4 The authors thank the referee for this suggestion. These are cases where fatalities are zero, not because the operation 
failed but because the operation was pre-empted. Such cases, if included in the dataset, would reduce the mean or expected 
number of fatalities for planned attacks. The potential effects on the preference orderings are unclear. If each type of attack 
method is subject to a similar proportion of pre-emptions, the relative number of expected fatalities may not be significantly 
impacted.  
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Table 1 
RAND-MIPT: Fatalities and Variability of Outcomes 
Attack Type 
Average Fatalities Per 
Attack Per Year 
Standard 
Deviation 
Shapiro-
Wilkes (p) 
Armed Attacks 1.30 1.122 0.89 
Arson 0.32 0.751 0.21 
Assassination 1.04 0.387 < 0.001 
Hostage 3.59 11.661 0.615 
Bombing 1.28 1.545 0.71 
Hijacking 1.97 4.994 0.02 
Kidnapping 0.39 0.335 0.782 
 
 
Table 2 
GTD: Terrorist Attack Methods 2000 to 2008 
Attack Type 
Average Fatalities Per 
Attack Per Year 
Standard 
Deviation 
Shapiro-
Wilkes (p) 
Armed Assault 50.22 7.94 0.028 
Assassination 20.37 5.16 0.006 
Bombing 41.97 9.75 0.165 
Hostage-Taking 8.81 5.10 0.907 
Hijacking 10.77 17.06 0.266 
 
 
Figure 4 displays the log-normal cumulative distributions for each attack method. For the RAND-MIPT 
attack methods, few clear examples of FSD can be identified. For the GTD attack methods, ‘armed assault’ 
clearly dominates each attack method by FSD. Although ‘bombing’ is dominated by ‘armed assault’, it clearly 
dominates each other attack method by FSD and ‘assassination’ dominates ‘hostage-taking’. Referring 
specifically to the type of terrorist activity that is encompassed by the GTD data where the dominance 
results are clearest, it is possible to reach tentative conclusions about the attack methods that would be 
preferred by risk-averse terrorist decision-makers whose utility functions, 𝑢(𝑥), belong to the set of all 
utility functions such that 𝑢′(𝑥) ≥ 0 and 𝑢′′(𝑥) ≤ 0 for all 𝑥 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏] (Hadar and Russell 1969). This class of 
decision-makers will tend to favour ‘armed assault’ whenever it forms part a pair of attack methods. 
Similarly, ‘bombing’ will be preferred by this class of decision-makers when it is paired with any attack 
method other than ‘armed assault’ and ‘assassination’ will be preferred to ‘hostage-taking’. In each case, 
switching to ‘armed assault’ represents a FSD enhancement.  
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Figure 4 
Cumulative Distributions: (a) RAND-MIPT and (b) GTD 
 
 
Tables 3 and 4 present the second-order stochastic dominance (SSD) matrices for each pair of attack 
methods formed from each database. Each SSD matrix can be interpreted as follows. First, each attack 
method is assigned the row and column position that corresponds to its place in the lists presented in 
Tables 1 and 2. As such, row 1 and column 1 in Table 3 correspond to ‘armed attacks’ and so on. Each 
element of the matrix, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 , where 𝑖 and 𝑗 denote the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ row and 𝑗𝑡ℎ  column, displays the SSD result for each 
attack method pair 𝑖 and 𝑗. A value of 3 is present where there is no clear SSD ordering. A value of 1 is 
present when attack method 𝑖 SSD dominates attack method 𝑗. A value of 2 is present when attack method 
𝑖 is SSD dominated by attack method 𝑗. A value of 0 simply identifies the fact that an attack method cannot 
be ordered against itself. For example, in Table 3, 𝑎12 = 1 says that ‘armed attacks’ SSD dominates ‘arson’ 
whereas 𝑎15 = 3 says that there is no clear SSD result between ‘armed attacks’ and ‘bombing’ and 𝑎25 = 2 
says that ‘arson’ is SSD dominated by ‘bombing’.  Table 4 is interpreted in the same way. Although some 
attack methods dominate others by SSD, it is not true in general that unambiguous orderings are obtainable 
for each pair. In many cases, the constraint integral (6) is violated and neither attack method dominates. Of 
course, running into such a problem is one of the main shortcomings of the stochastic dominance method 
(Hart 2011, p.626). For the RAND-MIPT data, ‘arson’ and ‘kidnapping’ are the attack methods most 
consistently dominated by SSD. For most other pairs there is generally no clear SSD result. For the GTD 
data the matter is more clear-cut. The SSD results reflect the FSD results that were already apparent from 
the plots of the cumulative distributions. As we concluded above, ‘armed assault’ dominates by FSD (and 
SSD). 
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Table 3 
RAND-MIPT: Stochastic Dominance (SSD) Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 0 1 3 3 3 3 1 
2  0 2 2 2 2 3 
3   0 3 3 3 1 
4    0 3 3 1 
5     0 3 1 
6      0 1 
7       0 
 
Table 4 
GTD: Stochastic Dominance (SSD) Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1 0 1 1 1 1 
2  0 2 1 3 
3   0 1 1 
4    0 3 
5     0 
 
 
IV. Trigger Points 
FSD and SSD provide partial orders over the pairs of attack methods. In some cases, a clear result is 
obtained. In others, there is not a clearly defined dominance of one attack method over the other. Although 
this is a shortcoming of the stochastic dominance methodology, when clear dominance results are obtained 
they apply to a wide range of decision-makers (Fishburn 1964; Hadar and Russell 1969). As we have 
mentioned before, the original PT permitted violations of FSD. CPT ensures that violations of FSD are not 
observed. If one attack method dominates the other by FSD it will also be found to have the higher prospect 
value for all reference points (Levy and Wiener 2013). When there is no clear FSD result but a clear (or 
unclear) SSD result, prospect theory will accord prospect values that change as the reference point against 
which the prospects are assessed changes. That is, prospects are reordered as the reference point increases 
or decreases. CPT permits attack method switching when the terrorist’s reference point changes as long as 
there is no violation of FSD.  We want to identify those reference points at which the reordering of attack 
methods in favour of the more risky alternative takes place.  
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Table 5 reports the results of an application of CPT to selected attack method pairs formed from the RAND-
MIPT data. The prospect values for each attack method are presented and the reference points at which the 
more risky alternative in a given pair is accorded the higher prospect value are highlighted. For most cases, 
the trigger points occur at relatively low reference points. That is, the less risky alternative rarely holds its 
position as having the higher prospect value over a range of more than a few reference points. From a law 
enforcement perspective, these results acquire some degree of practical significance when it is considered 
that a reference point may be shaped by the outcomes of previous or recent terrorist attacks. If low-
outcome attacks generate low reference points among terrorists planning to carry out subsequent 
attacks—or ‘copycat’ attacks5—then the attack methods that terrorists select may be more targeted in 
nature. If, on the other hand, high-outcome attacks generate high reference points, higher risk attack 
methods might be more likely to be selected for subsequent attacks. This may be the case regardless of the 
attack method used in the earlier attack. Attack methods with more variable outcomes also have higher 
expected fatalities, in general. They are also, by nature, less targeted or discriminating. The implications 
are most stark for a pair such as ‘assassination’ and ‘bombing’. For low reference points, assassination will 
be accorded the higher prospect value. This ordering is reversed for reference points higher than 2 
fatalities. From a law enforcement preparation and response perspective, the scenes of these two types of 
attacks may be quite different. Which is more likely to be experienced may be determined to some extent 
by the terrorist’s reference point. The outcomes of recent attacks might shine some light on this aspect of 
the terrorist’s decision-making profile.  
 
Table 5 
RAND-MIPT: Prospect Values and ‘Trigger’ Reference Points 
Attack Method Pairs (𝑖, 𝑗) Prospect Values (𝑖, 𝑗) 
(Ref = 1) (Ref = 2) (Ref = 3) (Ref = 4) (Ref = 5) (Ref = 6) 
Armed Attacks, Assassination 1.017, 1.172 0.982, 1.0499 0.944, 0.796 0.904, 0.562 0.865, 0.363  0.826, 0.144 
Armed Attacks, Bombing 1.017, 1.008 0.982, 0.987 0.944, 0.965 0.904, 0.943 0.865, 0.921 0.826, 0.90 
Armed Attacks, Hostage-Taking 1.017, 1.000 0.982, 0.999 0.944, 0.999 0.904, 0.999 0.865, 0.999 0.826, 0.999 
Arson, Assassination 1.021, 1.172 0.865, 1.0499 0.732, 0.796 0.6072, 0.562 0.488, 0.363 0.373, 0.144 
Assassination, Hostage-Taking 1.172, 1.000 1.0499, 0.999 0.796, 0.999 0.562, 0.999 0.363, 0.999 0.144, 0.999 
Assassination, Bombing 1.172, 1.008 1.0499, 0.987 0.796, 0.965 0.562, 0.943 0.363, 0.921  0.144, 0.90 
Bombing, Hijacking 1.008, 1.000 0.987, 0.9992 0.965, 0.998  0.943, 0.997 0.921, 0.996 0.90, 0.994 
Hijacking, Kidnapping 1.000, 1.079 0.999, 0.5896 0.998, 0.239 0.997, –0.089 0.996, –0.405  0.994,  –0.711 
 
To complete the analysis we return to our discussion of stochastic dominance and, in particular, the 
cumulative distributions that describe the outcomes of each attack method. In our treatment of the relevant 
theory we highlighted Braido and Ferreira’s (2006) result which centred on the conditions under which an 
application of a convex incentives schedule to risky prospects would compel the decision-maker to select 
the more risky alternative from a pair of prospects regardless of the decision-maker’s preferences. When 
the cumulative distributions for two prospects intersect—and FSD is ruled out—an incentives schedule 
exists that will guarantee the selection of the more risky prospect from a pair even if that prospect is 
                                                          
5 See Phillips and Pohl (2014).  
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dominated by SSD by the less risky prospect. Once pointed out, it is quite obvious that the cumulative 
distribution for a prospect dominated by SSD lies to the right of the cumulative distribution of its alternative 
past the point at which the two cumulative distributions intersect. This ‘trigger point’, however, remains 
dormant in the sense that it plays no direct role in shaping the choice of the risk-averse decision-maker. 
Although the decision-maker may be aware that potentially higher outcomes are in general attainable by 
the selection of a more risky prospect, there will be other overriding considerations (i.e. risk). Braido and 
Ferreira’s (2006) analysis shows that a convex incentives schedule that censures the cumulative 
distributions at the point of intersection serves to activate the trigger point. When positive payoffs are 
restricted to outcomes beyond this point, the more risky prospect dominates by FSD.  
 
Table 6 presents the (approximate) intersection points of the cumulative distributions for each pair of 
attack methods. A value of 0 identifies those cases where the cumulative distributions do not intersect (i.e. 
where there are clear FSD outcomes). The other values are the intersection points of the cumulative 
distributions. For example, 𝑎15 = 4 in Table 6 indicates that the cumulative distributions for ‘armed attacks’ 
and ‘bombing’ intersect at 4 fatalities. This result can be interpreted in conjunction with Figure 4 (a). For 
example, beyond an outcome of 4 fatalities the cumulative distribution for ‘bombing’ lies to the right of the 
cumulative distribution for ‘armed attacks’. With reference to Braido and Ferreira (2006), the intersection 
points in Table 6 may be activated by the application of a convex schedule of incentives. Although such a 
schedule is conceivable and might be applied deliberately by a terrorist group or inadvertently, incentives 
might be less important in shaping the terrorist’s decision to select the more risky attack method than we 
might think. If the terrorist context, especially the outcomes of recent attacks, has reshaped terrorists’ 
reference points, they may already be inclined to select a more risky attack method.  
 
Table 6 
RAND-MIPT: Cumulative Distribution Intersection Points 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1 0 0 2.5 3 4 3 0 
2  0 6 0.5 0 0.5 1.5 
3   0 2.5 2.5 2.5 0 
4    0 2.5 2.5 1.5 
5     0 3 1 
6      0 1.5 
7       0 
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V. Conclusions 
In this paper, we explore the circumstances under which a terrorist decision-maker might be expected to 
choose the more risky and—generally potentially more damaging—of two attack methods. We use two 
related approaches: (1) cumulative prospect theory (CPT); and (2) stochastic dominance. The two 
approaches are linked. Any preference ordering obtained from CPT must not—and will not—violate first-
order stochastic dominance (FSD). It can be shown that there are points within both frameworks that are 
associated with the decision-maker switching to the more risky alternative in a given pair of risky 
prospects. We call these points ‘trigger points’. Within CPT these trigger points are associated with 
reference points. When the decision-maker’s reference point is high enough, the more risky prospect is 
accorded the higher prospect value. Within stochastic dominance these trigger points are associated with 
the intersection of the cumulative distributions for each prospect. Convex incentives schedules applied at 
the intersection of the cumulative distributions will activate the trigger point. Trigger points emerge 
without violating FSD. In the case of CPT, trigger points emerge for prospects where no clear dominance 
exists to be violated. In the case of stochastic dominance, second-order dominance (SSD) has embedded 
within it the property that past the point of intersection of two cumulative distributions, the prospect 
dominated by SSD dominates its alternative by FSD6.  
 
We analyse two sets of data: (1) RAND-MIPT data for the period 1968 to 2007; and (2) GTD data for the 
period 2000 to 2008. We treat the attack methods encompassed within these databases as risky prospects 
expected to inflict fatalities 𝑥𝑖  with probability 𝑝𝑖 , where (𝑝1 + 𝑝2 +⋯+ 𝑝𝑛 = 1). Applying stochastic 
dominance to pairs of risky attack methods reveals that the RAND data contains few instances of clear FSD 
or SSD. This contrasts markedly with the GTD where ‘armed assault’ dominates each other attack method 
by FSD and ‘bombing’ dominates each other attack method (excluding ‘armed assault’) by FSD. This is 
reflected in the plots of the cumulative distributions. For a wide class of risk-averse decision-makers, 
stochastic dominance implies that ‘armed assault’ will be the most common choice from any pair of attack 
methods that can be formed from the GTD. Conversely, stochastic dominance reveals somewhat less about 
the RAND data. Far from being uninteresting, the absence of clear FSD results and the many intersections 
that characterise the cumulative distributions for the RAND attack methods provide scope for the existence 
of ‘trigger points’.  
 
When CPT is applied to pairs of attack methods formed from the RAND data, the decision-maker with 
reference point 1 (expected fatality)7 invariably accords the highest prospect value to the less risky 
alternative. For example, at reference point 1 ‘assassination’ is accorded a prospect value of 1.172. This 
would make it the preferred attack method from any pair for a decision-maker characterised by this 
reference point. Like ‘assassination’, ‘kidnapping’ also has a very low standard deviation of outcomes. It is 
accorded the second highest prospect value for a decision-maker with reference point 1. Although both 
                                                          
6 Its cumulative distribution lies to the right of its alternative past the point at which the two cumulative distributions 
intersect.  
7 It is implicitly assumed, of course, that the parameter values determined by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) apply in this 
context. Clarifying this point is a matter for future research.  
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attack methods are associated with a low expected number of fatalities—1.04 for ‘assassination’ and 0.39 
for ‘kidnapping’—the outcomes are relatively certain. This ordering is quite sensitive to the decision-
maker’s reference point. As the reference point increases, a lower prospect value is accorded to each attack 
method but the prospect values accorded to the less risky alternatives decline faster than the prospect 
values accorded to their more risky alternatives (Phillips and Pohl 2014). In most cases, the trigger point 
for each pair of attack methods is located at reference points 2, 3 or 4. For example, ‘armed attacks’ is 
accorded a higher prospect value than ‘bombing’ by decision-makers with a reference point of 1 but is 
accorded a lower prospect value by decision-makers with reference points of 2 or more. The same is true 
of ‘armed attacks’ and ‘hostage-taking’ and ‘bombing’ and ‘hijacking’.  
 
In each case, the CPT trigger points lie below the intersection points of the cumulative distributions. 
Approximately, a decision-maker with a reference point that corresponds to the point at which the two 
cumulative distributions begin to converge will accord a higher prospect value to the more risky of the two 
prospects. For example, the cumulative distributions for ‘bombing’ and ‘armed attacks’ intersect at 
approximately 3.5 fatalities where ‘bombing’ is accorded a higher prospect value by decision-makers with 
a reference point of 2 or more. We explained that convex incentives applied at the intersection of two 
cumulative distributions will compel the decision-maker to choose the more risky alternative from a pair 
of risky prospects. In a context where there is reason to believe that terrorists may have formed relatively 
high reference points, incentives are likely to be a less important driver of risk-taking behaviour and vice 
versa. If it is plausible to consider that the fatalities inflicted by the most recent terrorist attack—or perhaps 
the most devastating previous attack—form the basis of the reference point from which a terrorist planning 
a subsequent attack assesses alternative attack methods, the results contained in this paper are 
operationally relevant from a law enforcement perspective. In particular, attacks that inflict high fatalities 
may prompt terrorists to choose high risk attack methods which have a higher number of expected 
fatalities.   
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